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COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
C0M(83)  304  final 
Brussels,  3rd  June  1983 
THE  OIL  REFINING  INDUSTRY  OF  THE  COMMUNITY 
(Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council) 
COM(83)  304  final Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the 
Council  on  the  Oil  Refining  Industry of'the Community. 
I.  Introduction 
1.  In  a  Communication  to  the  Council  of  October  1981  CCOM  C81)  534  final>  the 
Commission  drew  attention to  the  problems  of  the oil  refining  industry  and 
in  particular to its poor  profitability over  the  greater part  of  the  period 
1974-80. 
2.  The  Commission  identified,  as  a  major  and  remediable  cause  of  the  industry's 
inadequate  margins,  the  large  excess  of  basic  refining  capacity which  had 
arisen  mainly  as  a  result  of  the  fall  in oil  consumption  following  the oil 
price  increases  of  ~973/4 and  1979/80  (the-trends  in  capacity and  demand  are 
shown  in  Annex  1) •.. ,It  s~ggeste~ that  the  cap~city required  to  supply  the 
foreseen  level  of  demand  of  about  500  million  tons  Cm.t.)  was  of  the order  of 
600  millton  tons  per  year  (m.t/y),  25%  less  than  that  available  in January  1981. 
-.  ., 
3.  The  difficulties of  the  Community's  industry  were  compounded  by  similar develop-
ments  elsewhere  in  the  world,  which  Led  to over-capacity in every phase.  In 
particular the  fall  in  the  import  requirements  of  the  USA  and  other traditional 
EEC  export  markets  restricted the outlet  for  Community  refiners  at  a  time  when 
North  African  exports  were  increasing their share of  the  home  market.  Annex  2 
illustrates the  change  in  the  capacity-demand  balance  in  the  main  regions  of 
the  world  since  1973. 
4.  A further  cause  for  concern  was  the  need  for  the  industry,  in  these  depressed 
conditions,  to undertake  major  investments  to adapt  its output  to  a  rapidly 
changing  pattern of  product  demand,  characterised by  a  steep declinein  the  use 
of  heavy  fuel  oils  for  electricity generation  and  by  certain other  major  industrie~ 
5.  The  Commission  recommended  to  the  Council  that  th~ solution of  these  problems 
could  and  should  be  left  to  the  companies  themselves,  each  adapting  its EEC 
operations  to theforeseen demand  for  its products,  provided  that  neither  security 
of  supply  nor  freedom  of  competition  was  endangered  in  the  process.  The 
Commission-·for  its part  undertook  to  monitor  progress  and  to  report  to the 
Council  as  necessary.  This  was  last  done  in  a  Communication  to  the  July 1982 Council  (COM  (82)  360  of  15.6.1982>. 
6.  The  Commission  has  sought  to assist  indirectly  in  the  rest·tlcturing.process  by 
providing to  the  industry  a  degree  of  transparency  not  previously available  and 
by  suggesting  what  future  capacity  requirements  were  likely to  be.  In bilateral 
consultrtions  which  have  taken  place  for  some  years  at  six monthly  intervals, 
the  companies  have  supplied  data  regarding existing capacity,  planned  investments 
and  withdrawals,  and  refinery processing,  which  have  enabled the  C~mission to 
draw  upa reasonably  accurate  picture of  the  state of  the  industry and  its future 
' 
shape.  The  capacity forecasts  made  in  this  ~3Y have  then  been  compared  with 
the  expected  trend  and  composition  of  demand,  and  t:l~  results  made  available  to 
the  industry  in  aggregated  form  as  a  reference  for  action  by  individual  companies. 
7.  The  Commission  has  just  completed  a  ne~ round  of  consultations  with  the  industry, 
and  with  member  states.  The  purpose  of  this  document  is to  inform  the  Council  of 
the  present  situation  and  prospects  of  the  industry  and  to  seek  the  Council's 
agreement  to  a  number  of  orientations  for  the  future. j. 
II.  Distillation Capacity  and  Needs 
8.  The  volume  of  crude  processed  in  Community  refineries declined  by  a  further 
7.5%  in  1982  to  422  m.t.,  one  third below  1973,  as  a  result  of  Lower  consumption, 
higher_net  imports  of  finished  products,  and  withdrawals  from  stocks.  This 
'  trend,  and  the  expectations  of  Member  States  and  industry for  the  future  are 
summarised  in the table  below. 
EEC  - 10  Demand  on  Commun~ty Refineries  1973-90  (m.t.) 
Consumption 
Net  Imports  (-) 
Stock  Change 
Refinery  Intake 
Mid-year  Capacity 
-actual/firm plans 
- required ar 80%<3> 
utili sat.i on 


























Ind. <1 > 
425  455 
-70  - -30 
355  - 425 
630 
44.0  - 530 






(1)The  range  of  the  estimates  provided  by  ten  companies  in  February/March  1983. 
(2)Consumption  is aggregate of  Member  State estimates of  9/82;  Net  imports  are 
Commission  estimate. 
(3)80X  utlisation is generally  regarded  as  satisfactory for  economic  operation 
and  as  giving  adequate  cover  for  demand  fluctuations. 
Consumption 
9.  Current  estimates  of  the  demand  upon  Community  refineries  in  1990  thus  range  from 
a  Low  of  355  m.t.  to  a  high  of  435  m.t.  If  BOX  is taken  as  an  acceptable  level 
of  average  plant  utilisation,  the  corresponding  rounded  figures  for  total 
capacity  required  would  be  450-550  m.t/y.  The  Commission  recommends  that 
the  Community's  available  capac~tv should  be  sufficient  to  cover  the  high~st 
Likely  Level  of.demand  and  that  planning  should  therefore  be  based  on  a  figure 
of  550  m.t/y for  the  year  1990.  Moreover  tne  Commission  believes that  on  this 
occasion  the  companies'  estimates err on  the  low  side  because  : 4. 
they  were  elaborated against  the  assumption  that  the  Jil  price  would 
remain  in  real  terms  at  the  Level  of  end  1982,  i.e.  above  130/bbl. 
Lower  figures  are  serious  possibilities  in  the  light  of  e~ents in 
re~ent months.  Although  the  companies  maintain  that  energy demand 
• 
is price-inelastic  over  a  considerable  range,  the  Commission  believes 
that  on  the  contrary it will  prove  responsive  to  falling prices  as  it 
did  to  the  preceding  rise. 
should  estimates  of  Community  energy derrand  prove  too  low,  there  would 
be  a  disproportionate  rise  in the  consumption  o.  oil  as  the  swing  fuel. 
Thus  a  5%  increase  in  energy  co~su~rtion in  1990  would  raise oil demand  by 
11%  in  1990  if the  contribution  from  other  fuels  were  unchanged. 
Community  estimates  of  ~ne~gy from  nuclea~ and  perhaps  coal  are  more  likely 
to  be  over- than under-stated,  and  any  shortfall will  be  made  good  at  least 
partly  by  oil. 
Imports  of  Petroleum  Products 
10.  Predictions  regarding the  future  level  of  net  imports  of  finished  products,  the 
other determinant  of  the  demand  on  Community  refineries,  also vary  widely  from 
30  m.t.  to  70  m.t.  in  1990.  Since  1973  the  external  balance  has  moved  from  a 
surplus  of  25  m.t.  to  an  estimated deficit  of  24  m.t.  in  1982,  thereby  reducing 
demand  on  Community  refineries  by  50  m.t/y  or  8%.  This  deterioration  has 
resulted.partly from  reduced  exports,  in  line  with  the  general  contraction  in 
international  product  trade  (by  10%  1981  /1973),  but  mostly  from  increased 
imports  from  sources  as  diverse  as  the  USA,  Spain  and  Algeria  and  particularly 
the  USSR  whose  shipments  to  the  Community  are  three  times  those  of  the  next 
supplier. 
11.  The  increase  in  net  import~ of  products  from  15  m.t.  in  1981  to  an  estimated 
24  m.t.  in  1982  was  largely due  to  the  anomalous  relationship  in  1982  between 
prices  for  crude oil  and  products.  Many  producers,  OPEC  and  non-OPEC,  anxious 
to  increase  sales  in  a  weak  market,  offered products,  manufactured  in  their 
own  or  third party refineries,  at  prices  equivalent  to  a  value  for  crude  much 
below  its official price.  EEC  refiners  therefore  found  it profitable to  run  les! 
crude  and  to ~crease  purchases  of  products  manufactured  overseas. 5. 
12.  It  seems  unlikely that  the  unusual  price  relationships  of  1982  and  early 
1983  can  become  a  lasting feature  of  the  market  (although  they'may  well 
recur  from  time  to  time>  because  discounted  product  prices  eventually under-
mine  6fficial  crude  oil prices- as  they did  in the first  quarter  of  1983. 
In  trying to assess  the  future  trend  in  product  imports  the  Commission  has 
therefore  regarded  the  1982  figure  as  abnormally  high  and  based  its estimates 
on  the  1980-82  average  of  around  20  m.t.  It must  be  recognised,  however, 
that  any  forecast  is subject  to even  greater uncertainty than  usual  and  that 
developmen~will therefore  have  to  be  closely monitored. 
·--~  13.  Although  increased  shipments  from  other  sources,  and  particularly the  USSR, 
cannot  be  ruled out,  the  main  factor  determining the  future  trend  in  EEC 
imports  is  expected to  be  the  increase  in  the  mid  1980's  in the  export  capacity 
of  OPEC  countries, especially Saudi  Arabia.  The  Commission's  estimate  of 
OPEC  export  availability is  shown  at  Annexe  3  but  it must  be  stressed that 
individual  estimates  vary over  a  considerable  range.  The  capacity forecast 
includes  only  those  OPEC  refineries  known  to be  under  construction or  committed. 
It  is  consequently  conservative,  especially as  regards  the  late 1980's  because 
no  provision  can  yet  be  made  for  new  construction  in  Iran or  Iraq  which  will 
undoubtedly  take place  eventually.  The  forecast  of  OPEC  countries•  domestic 
consumption  is that  made  by  the  OPEC  Secretariat  to  1985  and  extrapolated to 
1988  giving  a  rate  of  annual  average  increase  of  8.SX. 
14.  Taking  capacity utilisation at  85X- a  very  high  average  figure- export 
availability is estimated on  the  above  assumptions  to  rise  by  30  m.t/y  to 
120  m.t/y between  1980  and  1985/6.  Of  this  increase  it seems  reasonable, 
although  arbitrary, to  assume  that  one  third will  come  to the  EEC,  roughly 
in  line  with  the  Community's  share  of  OPEC  crude  exports.  EEC  net  imports 




The  Reduction  of  Crude  Distillation Capacity 
Since  EEC  capacity  peaked  at  around  830 m.t/y  in  1977  some  155  m.~/y has  been 
retired,  bringing  the  total  installed at  the  end  of  1982  to  about  675  m.t/y. 
(720  mt/y at  midyear).  Over  the  period  1977-82  18  refineries  were  closed, 
14  of  them  in  1981  and  82  alone,  and  a  considerable  number  of  units dismantled 
at  refineries  remaining  in  operation.  Firm  plansfor  1983-90,  including 6. 
five  more  complete  site closures,  will  bring  capacity down  to  about 
630~m.t/y, ·  200  m.t/y below  the  1977  total  and  80  m.t/y  above  the 
estimate  of  capacity  required  mentioned  in para  9.  A considerable 
further  effort  by  the  industry  to  cut  capacity by  another  80  m.t/y 
would  therefore  be  needed  to  reach  the  Commission's  suggested  figure 
of  550  m.t/y. 
16.  Capacity  reductions  have  always  been  discussed  in  Community  terms  because 
it  would  have  been  impracticable,: inefficient  and  inappropriate  to  seek 
similar  and  simultaneous  cuts  in  all  member  states.  In  fact,  however,  over 
the  period  1977-86,  there  are  not  expected to  be  Large  disparities  in the 
proportion of  capacity  withdrawn  in  those  countries  where  there  is  a  substantial 
refining  activity.  As  annexe  4  shows,  the  estimated  percentage  reductions 
apart  from  Greece  and  Ireland,  lie mostly  in the  20's  except  for Belgium  and 
the  Netherlands  whose  industries,  heavily export-orientated,  have  suffered 
most  from  the  fall  in  Community  and  third  country  demand,  and  where  over  30% 
of  capacity will  close. 
17.  Companies  commented,  often  in  some  detail, on  the  results  of  efforts to 
resettle  those  employed  at  refineries  which  had  been  or  were  to  be  closed. 
It  was  clear that,  in  most  of  the  fifteen  cases  covered,  the  number  of 
employees  who  would  be  left  without  a  job or  an  early pension  would  be  small. 
In  the  worst  cases,  namely  the  one  or  two  old  refineries  with  relatively  large 
work  forces  and  located  in  areas  of  high  unemployment,  the  number  might  reach 
a  few  hundred.  The  number  originally employed  at  th~ fifteen plants  was  about 
7~00,  some  10%'of  the  industry work  force;  about  1000  are  likely to  be 
Left  without  a  job or  an  early pension.  Companies  stressed the  importance  of 
planning  and  early action  in  limiting  the  consequences  of  closures  for  the 
staff.  In  several  instances  recruitment  had  been  stopped  Long  before  closure 
actually  took place,  both  at  the  plant  concerned  and  at  others  ~elonging to  thE 
same  group,  with  the  result  that  natural  wastage  had  greatly  reduced  the  size 
of  the  problem  of  redundancy.  Estimates  of  secondary  unemployment  in  firms 
supplying  goods  and  services  to  refineries  are  not  available.  The  effects are 
obviously  least  where  sites  remain  in  use  as  terminals  and  where  investments 
by  other  employers  in  the  area  are  in  progress. 1· 
18.  It  was  stressed that  even  when  job  Losses  were  small  the closure  of  plants 
was  difficult, protracted  and  costly.  These  high  "exit"  costs  could,  according 
to  several  companies,  deter  owners  from  closing plants,  especially  when  the 
obligation  to maintain  compulsory  stocks  made  it  impossible  to  realise  the 
potential  working  capital  savings  available  from  closure. 
19.  The  continued  supply  of  the  areas  served  by  refineries  now  closed  appears  to  have 
presented  few  probelms.  In  ireland,  however,  the  government  has  judged  it 
necessary  to  purchase  and  reopen  the  only  refinery,  closed  by  its previous  owners, 
because  of  its  concern  about  security of  supply.  Certain  featuFes  of  the  measure~ 
taken  to·~~sure continued  operation  of  this  refinery  are  currently  being 
questioned  both  by  the  Commission  and  in  the  Courts. 
Most  of  the  other  sites  have  remained  in  operation  as  terminals,  supplied  with 
products  by  the  former  crude  oil  lines,  or  by  water,  from  another  of  the  companie~ 
refineries.  In  one  or  two  cases  arrangements  have  been  made  between  companies  to 
supply  each  other's  product  requirements  in  specific  areas  following  refinery 
closures.  In  themselves,  such  arrangements  are  not  contrary to  the  Treaty, 
provided  that  free  competition  in  the  mrket  is  not  affected. 
20.  Several  companies  expressed  the  view  that  the  surplus  of  distillation  capacity 
was  no  longer  a  major  cause  of  low  profitability.  They  argued  that,  given  the 
relationship  between  crude  oil  and  product  prices,  there  was  no  commercial 
incentive  for  the  EEC  refiner,  processing  OPEC  crude,  to  use  spare  primary 
capacity  unless  he  could  upgrade  the  primary distillation yield.  Hence  the 
existence  of  spare distillation units  had  no  effect  on  prices  in  the  market. 
The  Commission  does  not  share  this  view.  Although  the  EEC  refiners  may  see  no 
margin  on  primary distillation,  OPEC  producers,  anxious  to  increase  their  sales 
of  Low  cost  crude,  are  plainly  in  a  different  position  and  in  fact  processed  in 
1982  quite  Large  quantities  in  European  refineries  for  the  distillation yield. 
Spare  topping  capacity,  especially  in  the  Mediterranean,  cannot  therefore  be 
disregarded  and  the  Community  should  continue  its efforts  to  bring total  capacity 
into  line  with  domestic  demand. 
21.  The  offer  for  sale  of  several  of  the  refineries  closed  by  international  majors 
has  raised  the  question  whether  in  fact  apparent  reductions  in  the  capacity  in 
service  will  prove  to be  illusory because  plants  are  resold  to  companies  whose 
supply  costs  are  Lower.  The  Commission  has  in  the  past  argued  that  this  would 
probably  not  occur  on  a  significant  scale,  because  producers'  integrated  margins 
on  production  and  refining  were  unlikely to exceed,  and  could  well  be  Less  than 
that  on  crude  oil  sales.  In  1982  however,  the  case  for  acquiring  downstream 8. 
assets  was  transformed  by  the  inability of  certain  producer~ to  sell  at 
official  prices as  much  crude  oil  as  they  wished  or  w~s oermitted  under 
OPEC  quota  agreements.  In  these  circumstances  the  only  way  in  which 
producers  can  increase  crude  oil  production,  while  keeping  faith  with 
their_ OPEC  obligations,  is to  increase  product  sales either  from  their 
' 
own  refineries or  from  third party  refineries  under  processing  arrangements. 
Acquisition of  existing assets  will  inevitably appear  the  soundest  and  least 
disruptive  way  to  secure  a  Long-term  outlet  for  products  at  consumer  rather 
than  spot  prices.  To  the  extent,'however,  that  the  newcomersacquire 
refining  capacity  in  excess  of  the  marketing  outl0t  purchased  they  will 
be  under  the  same  economic  pressure  as  the  former  ownersto close  some  of  it. 
22.  As  the  demand  for  OPEC  crude  revive3  the  incentive  for  producers,to  invest 
downstream  is  likely  to diminish.It  is, however,  too early to  judge  the 
extent  to  which  capacity  will  simply  change  hands  rather  than  be  permanently 
withdrawn,  and  developments  will  have  to be  monitored. 
IV.  Structural  and  operating  changes  in the  market 
23.  There  have  occurred  in  the  Last  year  or  so  therefore  several  developments  of 
considerable  importance,  namely 
an  increase  in  purchases/imports  of  products  and  feedstocks  by  Community 
refiners 
acquired. 
and  a  corresponding  reduction  in  the  quantity  of  crude  oil 
an  increase  in  processing of  crude  by  producing  countries  in  Community 
and  third  country  refineries. 
the  acquisition  by  producers  of  downstream  assets  in the  Community. 
24.  The  first  two  developments  resulted  from  the discounting  of  product  prices 
relative to the official  crude  price;  they  are  reversible  and  may  prove  to 
be  shdrt-lived.  They  were  beneficial  in  forcing  crude  oil  prices  down 
towards  the rurket clearing  level;  detrimental  in  so  far  as  they  caused 
new  disparities  in  the  acquisition  costs  of  different  importers  to the 
disadvantage  of  companies  Locked  in  to  crude oil  contracts  at official prices. 
Processing  arrangements  were  profitable to  EEC  refiners  and  d1d  not  destabilise 
the  market  when  the  products  were  purchased  by  established  refiner/marketers 
and  distributed through  their networks  ;  they  had  adverse  effects on  market 
prices,  however,  when  the  products  were  unloaded  on  to  an  already  glutted 
spot  market. 9. 
25.  The  acquisition by  the  Kuwait  Petroleum  Corporation of  the  refining and 
marketing  assets  of  some  of  the  US  Gulf  Corporation's  European  affiliates, 
and  by  Saudt- Arabian  interests of  those  of  Standard of  Indiana  in Italy, 
are  deve~opments of  more  profound  and  lasting  importance.  The  same  is true 
l 
of  the  formation  by  Petroven  and  Veba  of  a  joint venture  to process  heavy 
Venezuelan  crude oils. 
26.  All  these  investments  by  producing  countries offer  potential  advantages 
to  the  Communitya  They  give  to the  producers  concerned  a  long-term  interest 
in  maintaining  regular  supplies  to the  Community  and  a  first-hand  knowledge  of 
the  realities of  the market  place.  They  should  improve  .understanding and 
cooperation between  producing  and  importing  countries.  To  the extent  that 
refinery acquisitions  remove  the  producers'  need  to build  refining capacity at 
source,  they  reduce  the  general burden of  excess  capacity.  In  cases  where,  as 
in  the  Petroven/Veba  venture,  investments  in  advanced  and  novel  processes provide 
in  the  Community  the  capability to treat  very  heavy  crudes,  there  is  again  to 
diversity of  supply,  and  a  transfer of  technology  to  the producer 
27.  It is  important,ofcourse,that  the  producers  should  supply  crude  oil  to their  refinhg 
affiliates at  the  same  price  as  to third parties,  so  that  they  compete  on  even 
terms  in the market  place.· The  Commission  believes that  the  newcomers  are  likely 
to  take  this  conside~ation into account. 
28.  The  transfer of  refining assets  to producing  countries  could,  ho~ever, in  some 
circumstances,  have  adverse  effects  upon  the  diversity and  consequently the 
security of  supply.  For  example,  if  a  signficant  part of  the  Community  industry 
were  to  come  into the  ownership  of  one  or  two  producing countries,· 
the effects  upon  the  Community  of  a~interruption of  exports  from  those 
countries  could  be  serious. 10. 
V.  Conversion  Capacity 
29.  While  coping  with  the  problem  of  excess  primary  capacity  the  companies 
have  been d*igoo to  undertake  large  programmes  of  investment  to  adapt  the 
produc~ output  of  refineries to the  changing  pattern of  demand,  and,  in partic-
ular,  to  the  much  reduced  outlet  for  residual  fuel  oil,which  is  expected  to 
remain  uncompetitive  with  other  energy  forms,  partic~Larly coal.  Estimates 
of  the  changes  to  be  expected  in  the  relative  demand  for  the  various  products 
differ  considerably  from  one  company  to  another  but  a  middle  of  the  range 
forecast  is  as  follows  :-
EEC  - 10  Consumption  of:Main  Product  Group  73-90 
1973  1981  1990 
m  .t.  %  m. t.  X  m. t.  X 
GasoLine  ,.  _-;  72  12.0  79  "16.6  83  18.0 
Gasoil/Kero  201  33.J  170  35.8  180  38.0 
Fuel  Oil  205  34.0  126  26.. 5  103  22.0 
Other/own  use  125  20.7  100  21 • 1  104  22.0 
Total  603  100.0  475  100.0  470  100.0 
---
30.  While  consumption  of  motor  gasoline  and  gasoil/kerosine  is  forecast  to  rise 
slightly,  fuel  oil  use  is expected to fall  by  a  further  20%  by  1990  to a  level 
only  SOX  of  1973.  It  would  then  represent  22%  of  the  barrel  as  compared  with 
34%  in  1973.  "Other  products",  which  include  the  petrochemical  feedstock 
naphtha,  and  other  non-energy  products,  roughly  maintain  their volume  and 
increase their share. 
31.  Progress  by  the  industry  in  expanding  conversion  capacity,  and  its  current  firm 
projects, are  summarised  in  the  table  below  : 32. 
11 • 
EEC-10  Intake  Capacity of  Conversion  Plant  1973-86 
(Milli6n  of  tonnes/year) 
73  81  82  86 
Catalytic  Crackers  43.0  59.0  66.5  68.7 
Thermal  crackers  ) 
~  11.2 
11.2  11.8 
Visbreakers  21.0  36.7  45.0  48.0 
Cokers  .  8.5  8.5  11.0 
Hydrocrackers  4.0  6.7  7:0  12.5 
Total  68.0  122.1  138.0  152.0 
Equivalent  catcracker 
capacity *  60.0  100.0  110.0  125.0 
% of  distillation capacfty  8  13  15  23 
% of  crude  run  9  22  26  28 
In order  roughly  to measure  the  growth  in overall  capacity to  convert  residue  to 
distillates, the  capacitiesofmhertypes of  plant  of  widely  differing capability have 
been  calculated  in  terms  of  the  degree  of  conversion  relative  to  the  catalytic 
cracker,  the  most  commonly  used  unit.  So  measured,  conversion  capacity has  almost 
doubled  since  1973  and  is estimated  to  rise  a  further  14%  by  1986.  By  1986  it should 
be  possible to  upgrade  28%  of  the  crude  distilled  in  Community  refineries  compared 
with  9%  in  1973. 
The  Commission  estimates  that,if current  programmes  are  carried through,  the  capacity 
available  will  be  at  Least  adequate  to  meet  any  Likely pattern of  produc~ demand  in 
1990,especially having  regard  to the  expansion  of  conversion  capacity  in  Spanish 
refineries. 
*Relative distillate yields  taken  as  :  Catcracker  1.00, Visbreaker  0.33, 
thermal  cracker  0.65,  Hydrocracker  1.50,  Coker  1.50. 12. 
VI.  Conclusions 
33.  Voluntary  action  by  the  companies  reduced  industry's  primary  capacity during 
1981/82  by  100  m.t/y  {13%)  bringing the total  at  the  end  of  1982  to  about 
675  e.t/y.  Additional  closures  firmly  planned  should  further  reduce  capacity 
to  630  m.t/y.  The  burden  of  capacity  reduction  is being  shared  by  all  the 
larger  member  states  and  by  alL  the maj.or  refining  groups. 
The  approach  to  the  problem  of  over-capacity  adopted  by  the  Council  of  October 
1981  appears  therefore  to  have  been  effective  and  should,  in  the  Commission's  view, 
be  continued. 
34.  The  capacity  requirement  suggested  to  the  Council  in  1981  was  600  m.t/y.  The 
subsequent  fall  in  consumption  and  the  Lower  estimates  for  1990  now  generally 
accepted,  suggest  that  the  capacity  requirement  in  that  year  is  unlikely  to exceed 
550  m.t/y.  A further  major  effort  by  the  companies  will  therefore  be  needed  to 
bring  capacity  from  the  present  675  m.t/y  to  550  m.t/y  as  rapidly  as  possible. 
35.  The  unemployment  effects  of  refinery  closures  in  1981/2  are  in  most  cases  slight 
and  the  number  without  work  or  pension  as  a  result  of  them  of  the  order  of  1000 
in  total.  No  special  measures  for  Community  assistance  are  therefore  necessary  at 
the  present  time. 
36.  Subject  to  the  point  mentioned  in  19  above,  t~ere is  no  evidence  that  closures  have 
posed  any  problems  of  continuity or  security of  supply.  In  one  or  two  cases 
arrangements  have  been  made  between  companies  to  supply  each  others  requirements. 
As  already  noted,  such  arrangements  ~re not  in  themselves  contrary to the  Treaty 
provided  that  free  competition  in  them~et is  not  af·re~ted. 
37.  The  rising trend  in  net  imports  of  finished  products  into  the  Community  is  within 
acceptable  limits  but  developments  remain  uncertain. 
38.  The  acquisition of  downstream  assets  in  the  Community  by  the  state entities of 
producing  countries,  which  began  in  1982  and  seems  Likely  to  continue  in  1983, 
is  a  development  of  considerable  importance  and  could  have  implications  for 
established  supply patterns. 13. 
39.  The  Commission  intends  to monitor  the  trend  in  net  imports  of  petroleum 
products,  and  investments  by  oil exporting countries  in  refining and  marketing 
assets  in  the  Community.  It  will  continue  consultations  with  governments, 
compa~i~~,and Trades  Unions  and  will  report  further  to  the  Council  as 
necessary. 
Action  requested of  the  Council 
40.  The  Council  is  requested  to agree  ·-
(a)  that  present  Community  policies  towards  the oil  refining industry, 
which  seeks  solutions  to  its problems  through  the  voluntary action  of 
the  companies,  monitored  by  the  Commission,  should  be  continued. 
(b)  that  further  efforts  to  reduce  Community  distillation capacity to 
550  m.t/y,  and  to concentrate  operations  at  fewer  more  complex  refineries, 
are  necessary  and  should  be  encouraged. (J) 
Eur 10: PRIMARY  DISTtLLATION  CAPACITY  CONSUMPTION 
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EEC  1973 
1981 
USA  1973 
1981 
JAPAN  1973 
1981 
REST  1973 
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TOTAL  1973 
1981 
UTILISATION  OF  DISTILLATION  CAPACITY 
IN  WESTERN  WORLD 
'  ''  .consumption  Net  Exports  Total  Demand 
Mill ion 
*  Capacity· 
of  Ref>i ned  ·  •  ~  ·.' : ,  .:  m.i d-:-){ear-, 
products  Refinedes  .  .. ,  .. 
603  +·  25  628  755 
475  15  460  770 
818  - 140  678  695 
...  ;  743  - 56  687  910 
269  - 35  234  230 
H4  - 23  201  282 
653  +  118  771  905 
828  +  54  882  1318 
2343  - 32  2311  ?585 
2270  - 40  '2230  3280 
*  Ignoring  stock.~~vements 
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.  ..,--~-:· 
. 1984".  1985  1986  .. 90 
I,('!·: I' j:  f.  1980  1981  1982  1983 
- .  s.  Arabia  750  I  850  1050  ~.  1050  1300  1800  2'100 
Kuwait  594  594  594  594  594  594  5?4 
U.A.E.  15  135  . 135  195  220  220  2?0 
Qatar  , 1  61  61  11 1  1  1  1  111  111 
Iraq  305  305  305  305  305  305  305 
Iran  530  530  530  530  530  530  ~30 
M.E.  2205  2475  2675  . 2785  3060  3560  37f.Q 
Alg.  436  611  611  611  611  611  761 
Libyt  130  130  350  350  350  350  350 
Gabon  44  44  44  44  44  44  44 
N1geria  260  260  260  260  260  260  260 
Africa  870  1045  1265.  1265  1265  1265  1415 
M.E  I  Africa  3075  3520  3940  4050  4325  4825  5175 
Latin  America  1540  1540  1540  1540  162!  , 623  16?~ 
.  Far  East  ~70  470  470  470  870  87~_!.~u 
I  ... 
5085  I 
5530  5950  6060  6818  7318  I  7668 






















EEC-10  :  Closures  carried out  or  planned  1977  - 90 
(millions of  tonnes/year) 
Capacity  Closed  Firm  Total  actual/ 
Projects  Fir11 
1/83  77-82  .1983· 90  1977-90  %  -- - .. 
36.3  19.0  - 19.0  y. 
8.1  2.8  - 2.8  26 
120.2  32.4  1.7  34.1  22 
18.7  (0.8)  - (0.8) 
142.5  29.0  8.0  37.0  22 
2.9*• 
155.0  27.0  13.4  40.4  '22 
78.4  24.0  8.8  32.8  32 
111.1  25.5  12.5  38.0  28 
-- -- -
673.2  158.9  44.4  ?03.3  24 
•  Future  capacity under  review by  government • 






Source  :  company  estimates of  Feb/"ar  1983  and  comments  by  some  member  governments. 
Total  actual! 
firm,  prObi'~le 
1977-90  %  . 
;. 
253.9  30 